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INTRODUCTION 
The control of exports in order to protect national interests is subject to a 
"frightful labyrinth" of laws and regulations. 1 The motive for enacting these 
laws varies: some are enacted to satisfy United States treaty obligations,2 
some for national security reasons,3 and others for humanitarian considera­
tions. 4 Further complicating matters, these laws issue from multiple 
* J.D. May 2006. Many thanks to Amy, Maggie, and Sean. I am particularly indebted to 
Tim Fort for inspiration on the topic, and to Rebecca Eisenberg and the participants of the Fall 2005 
Student Scholarship Workshop for hours of scrutiny and suggestions. 
I. Cecil Hunt, Overview of U.S. Export Controls, in P RACTICING LAW INST., COPING WITH 
U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2003, at 15 (2003). 
2. For example, the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 710--722 
(2005), implement the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-856 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6701--Q771 and in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C.), which in tum implements the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Produc­
tion, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. 
3. See, e.g., Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2000). 
4. For example, export of thumb cuffs and other restraint devices such as straight jackets is 
prohibited without a license to all countries other than Canada. 15 C.F.R. §§ 742.7(a)(4), 744 supp. 
l (2005). 
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sources.5 At times, the enabling legislation has lapsed only to be cobbled 
back together by interim legislation or by Executive Order.6 The result is a 
legal regime where "it can be difficult to find and piece together applicable 
law." 7 
The criteria for determining sanctions for violations of export controls 
have been similarly vague. Consider, for example, the determination of 
sanctions for violations of the export controls for dual-use technologies­
technologies and products that "can be used both in military and other stra­
tegic uses . . . and commercial applications"-set forth in the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR). Enforcement of those controls falls to 
the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the Department of Commerce.9 
In the event of a suspected violation, BIS has three options. At the extremes, 
it may either refer the case to the Department of Justice for criminal prose­
cution or issue a letter of warning. In the middle, it may pursue an 
administrative enforcement case.10 If the case is severe enough to merit 
criminal prosecution, the United States Sentencing Guidelines provide some 
guidance on the determination of penalties." There has been little guidance 
on appropriate punishment in cases that are not severe enough to merit 
criminal prosecution-those cases where administrative penalties are appro­
priate. Until recently, the extent of published guidance has been the 
maximum administrative sanctions found in the EAR, with no explanation 
of intermediate levels of sanctions falling short of the maximum. 12  
The Department of Commerce has recently acted to provide clearer pen­
alty guidance. On September 17, 2003, BIS proposed amendments to the 
EAR in order to provide guidance on "how BIS makes penalty determina­
tions when settling administrative enforcement cases" for violation of the 
EAR.13  BIS then incorporated that proposed rule into a final ruling on Feb­
ruary 20, 2004.14 As a result, the EAR now include a supplement at 15 
C.F.R. § 766 that, for the first time, provides government criteria for setting 
5. The three most significant agencies are the Department of Commerce (dual-use tech­
nologies), the State Department (military weapons), and the Treasury Department (financial exports 
and broad-based embargoes that cover more than exported goods). Hunt, supra note I, at 16--18. 
6. Id. at 16--17. 
7. Id. at 15. 
8. 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2005). 
9. Id.§§ 730.1, 730.9. 
10. Id. § 766 supp. I; see also id. § 764.3. 
11. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 2M5. I -.2 (2000). 
12. The EAR provide that "a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 may be imposed for each 
violation, except that a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 may be imposed for each violation 
involving national security controls imposed under section 5 of the [Export Administration Act]." 15 
C.F.R. § 764.3(a)(l )(i) (2005). 
13. Export Administration Regulations: Enforcement and Protective Measures, 68 Fed. Reg. 
54, 402 (proposed Sept. 17, 2003)(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 764 and 766). 
14. Export Administration Regulations: Penalty Guidance in the Settlement of Administra­
tive Enforcement Cases, 69 Fed. Reg. 7867 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 764 and 
766). 
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a penalty in these administrative proceedings. 1 5  The penalty guidance is 
largely advisory. In fact, in publishing its penalty guidance, BIS included a 
disclaimer that the guidance was not binding on any party-even itself. 16 
Nevertheless, the guidance is significant for three reasons. First, it is the 
only published scheme for determining an administrative punishment for 
EAR violations, and therefore it likely would be persuasive to an adminis­
trative law judge presiding over an administrative enforcement action. 
Second, since many administrative cases are settled with BIS, it will repre­
sent the de facto penalty detennination method in many such cases.11 Third, 
the guidance is infonnative since it reflects BIS's institutional experience 
about what factors have been relevant to determining penalties in the past. 
The new penalty guidance sets out six "general factors" for determining 
appropriate sanctions, then lists eight aggravating factors and nine mitigat­
ing factors. 1 8  The general factors BIS will consider are: degree of 
willfulness, the destination involved, the commission of related violations, 
the commission of multiple unrelated violations, the timing of the settle­
ment, and any related criminal or civil violations. 19  Of the eight listed 
aggravating factors, three are to be given "great weight": making a deliber­
ate effort to conceal the violation, demonstrating a serious disregard for 
compliance responsibilities, and "the sensitivity of the items involved and/or 
the reason for controlling them to the destination in question."20 Of the nine 
listed mitigating factors, two are to be given "great weight": voluntary self­
disclosure of the violation and the company's having an effective export 
l . l 2 1 comp iance cu ture. 
15. Id. at 7870 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 766 supp. 1 )  ("[I]n view of the importance of 
this rule, which represents the first comprehensive statement of BIS's approach toward these issues, 
BIS sought and considered public comments . . . .  "). 
16. Id. ("This guidance does not confer any right or impose any obligation regarding what 
penalties BIS may seek in litigating a case or what posture BIS may take toward settling a case. 
Parties do not have a right to a settlement offer, or particular settlement terms, from BIS, regardless 
of settlement postures BIS has taken in other cases."). 
1 7. Id. 
18. Id. at 787 1 -72. 
19. Export Administration Regulations: Guidance on Charging and Penalty Determinations 
in Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases, 15 C. F.R. § 766 supp. 1 (2005). By "timing of 
the settlement" BIS indicates that the longer a violator waits to settle, the greater the penalty the 
bureau will seek. Id. at I ll.A ("BIS has an interest in encouraging early settlement and may take this 
interest into account in determining settlement terms."). 
20. Id. at I ll.B. The other aggravating factors are: likelihood of the type of harm the EAR are 
designed to prevent, the quantity or value of the exports, the presence of other violations of law that 
do not fal l  under the purview of BIS, prior bad acts by the exporter, and the extent that exports com­
prise the business of the firm in question. Id. 
2 1 .  Id. The other mitigating factors are: whether the violation was a single episode of good­
faith misinterpretation, whether BIS likely would have approved the action anyway, absence of prior 
similar acts, cooperation in the investigation, cooperating in the investigation of other parties, ab­
sence of likely harm of the type that the EAR are supposed to prevent, and general inex perience 
with export licensing. Id. The guidance directs the exporter to the Export Management System 
Guidelines, U.S. BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., EXPORT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM GUIDELINES (2005), 
available at http://www. bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcement/ExportManagementSystems.htm, 
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This Note argues that this last factor-the effective export compliance 
culture-should be the first step in the analysis rather than a mere mitigating 
circumstance to be considered after weighing all the other factors. Instead of 
first considering what BIS describes as the general factors and then mitigat­
ing for the presence of an effective compliance program, the degree of 
culpability should be determined through examining the culture of compli­
ance, tempered by considering the other general factors. Part I argues that 
the nature of export control enforcement requires extensive self-governing 
behavior on the part of exporters and that enforcement should be directed 
toward that end. Part II examines several possible justifications for penaliz­
ing a business entity and concludes that deterrence and rehabilitation 
through education are the most viable, particularly in a self-regulating in­
dustry. Part III argues that examining the export compliance program is 
actually a necessary prerequisite to determining the general culpability re­
quired under the general factors, and on that basis alone cannot be relegated 
to a mitigating factor. Part IV argues that an emphasis on corporate compli­
ance programs in punishment is the most effective route to deterrence and 
rehabilitation. Finally, Part V argues that findings from the field of corporate 
social responsibility indicate that the creation of a culture of compliance 
focused on executive accountability is most likely to result in effective con­
trols. 
I. SE LF-RE GU LATI N G  RE QUIREMENTS OF EXPORT CONTROLS 
This Part argues that export controls rely largely, in fact almost entirely, 
on self-regulatory behavior by exporters. This is a result of the export regu­
lations themselves, as well as the enforcement resources available to BIS 
and the small percentage of exports that require a license. Although BIS 
provides some level of after-the-fact enforcement, the primary effort is to 
prevent violations through education and guidance. 
Only a small fraction of total United States industrial exports-four per­
cent by one estimate-require a BIS export license.22 Given then that ninety­
six percent of exports do not require licensing, and that BIS, like any gov­
ernment agency, must economize the use of its enforcement resources, the 
Department of Commerce cannot reasonably be expected to place an agent 
at the site of every export transaction to watch over the shoulder of industry 
and ensure perfect compliance. 
Industrial exports can now occur at almost any location in the United 
States, yet BIS export enforcement field offices are located at only nine lo­
cations, with each field office providing enforcement supervision over a 
devel oped by BIS as a model of a c orporate c om pliance program. The EMS wil l be considered more 
fu lly in Part V. 
22. Cecil  Hunt, Department of Commerce Export Controls, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT 
CONTROLS 2003, at 90 (2003). 
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specified region.23 Although these field offices provide on-site enforcement 
abilities, there are significant export hubs that are not serviced by an on-site 
enforcement team, including Seattle, San Diego, and New Orleans. And 
while the chosen enforcement locations are sensible, any small firm could 
hypothetically commit an illegal unlicensed export by placing handcuffs in a 
padded envelope and mailing them to Turkey.2 4  
The complicated nature of the export license process itself makes dili­
gent efforts at self-regulation all the more necessary. When contemplating 
an export, it falls to the exporter to determine whether an item is restricted 
and what steps to take thereafter. In fact, the EAR confront an exporter with 
a total of at least twenty-nine steps that must be taken to determine how to 
comply.2 5  If, in just the very first step, the exporter incorrectly determines 
whether this is an item "subject to " the EAR, the exporter might ignore the 
rest of the process and the export will proceed unless some outside force 
intervenes.26 The licensing process itself is triggered only upon an applica­
tion by the exporter, which comes at step twenty-six of the process.2 7  An 
error in the preceding twenty-five steps, or the failure to comply with step 
twenty-six, could effectively remove the Department of Commerce from the 
equation. 
Of concern to both BIS and industry, the definition of the term "export" 
has expanded to include many activities that do not fit the traditional de­
scription, making it even harder to predict when and where controlled 
exports will occur and to dispatch a government regulator to oversee the 
process. The so-called "deemed export" rule provides that the release to a 
foreign national of technology or software source code that would otherwise 
be subject to the EAR is deemed to be an export of the technology in ques­
tion to the country of origin of the foreign national. 2 8  For example, by this 
standard it would be deemed an export to China to allow a Chinese profes­
sor visiting at a research university hundreds of miles from the nearest 
border to "visually inspect" technology that is covered by the EAR­
including the object itself, plans, blueprints, schematics, or specification 
23. See BIS Program Offices, http://www.bis.doc.g ov/about/programoffices.htm (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2006). The field offices are l ocated in B oston, New York, Washington, Miami, Chicag o, 
Dallas, San J ose, Los Angeles, and Houston. 
24. See 15 C.F.R. § 774 supp. I (2005) (C ommerce Control List Categ ory OA982). Restraint 
devices, a crime-c ontrol c ontrolled ex port listed under Category OA982, require a license for export 
to  any country other than Canada "[i)n support of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of 
human rights through out the world . . . .  " Id. § 742.7. 
25. See id. § 732. 1 .  
26. See id. § 732 supp. I. One would be excused for inc orrectly thinking this is an easy 
questi on . For an ex planati on of h ow nuanced that first questi on can be, see Hunt, supra note 22 , 
§ 3(d). For example, an item can be subject t o  the E AR  even if it is l ocated outside the United States 
and is being reexported by foreign nationals if there is U.S. content exceeding a de minimis thresh­
old of either ten percent or twenty-five percent by value. Id. § 3(d)(I). 
27. 15 C.F.R. § 732.4(b )(7 ) (2005 ). 
28. Id. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii ). 
1790 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104: 1785 
sheets.29 Admittedly this construction of the controls might be a necessary 
reflection of the changing nature of the ways that damaging items and tech­
nology can leave United States control. The point is that requiring on-site, 
prior inspection of every export is simply impossible. 
BIS recognizes this self-regulating nature of export controls in its ap­
proach to business. Beginning in 1991, BIS initiated the Business Executive 
Enforcement Team town-hall meetings. BIS engages in dozens of preventa­
tive training sessions annually,3 0  with the stated purpose of increasing export 
control compliance through education.3 1  BIS attributed a twenty percent in­
crease in the number of deemed-export license applications in fiscal year 
2003 to improved education and outreach on its part-not to increased 
numbers of deemed-exports.32 The bureau also attributed an identical twenty 
percent increase in deemed-export license applications in fiscal year 2004 to 
outreach.33 The logical inference is that some significant fraction of the 
deemed-exports in fiscal years 2002 and earlier were unlicensed simply be­
cause nobody ever applied for a license, perhaps out of ignorance. 
Finally, there is empirical evidence that erratic fluctuations in export li­
censes in recent years reflect the hit-or-miss nature of enforcement. In fiscal 
29. For a flavor of the reception that this rule receives, see the foll owing public comment 
posted to BIS by University of Florida professor Guido Mueller: 
The conseque nces of thi s new rule on our research will be disastrou s . . . .  Adding an appl ica ­
tion for a 'deeme d export license' for every foreign student for every high tech instrume nt will 
further dimi nish our capabilities to conduct our research . . . .  
What a joke ! . . .  
In my opinion there are two ways out : the first is that you stop this BS . . .. The second opti on 
is that we will start buying inte rnational products . .. . [w]e are actually all owe d to use them. 
Ple ase, do . . .  your g reat country a great favor and make sure that al l our students can work i n  
our Jabs with out havi ng t o  go through another stupid . . .  hu rdle. 
Email from Guido Mueller. Assistant Professor, University of Florida, to the Bureau of Indu stry and 
Security (May 5, 2005), http://efoia.bi s.doc.g ov/pubc omm/Revi si on%20to%20the%20Deemed %20 
Export%20Reg s%202005/FINAL %20DOCUMENT. pdf. 
For one of many industry objection s  t o  the deemed export rule, see Cynthia J ohn son, Vice 
Chair, Semiconductor Industry Associati on Export C ontrol s  Committee, Deemed Export Policy: A 
Worksh op on the IG' s  Report to the Department of C ommerce (May 6, 2005), http:// 
www7.nationalacademies.org/rscan s/C _Johnson _IG _Presentation. pdf ("The deemed export rule 
does n ot appear to  be a significant c ontributor to national security. At the same time, it di rectly 
c onflicts with and impai rs efforts to maintain [U.S.] techn ol ogical leadership."). 
30. See Seminars and Training, http://www.bis.doc.g ov/SeminarsAndTrain ing/index.htm 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2006). 
3 1 .  See Export Enforcement Program, http://www.bis.doc.gov/Enforcement/eeprogrrn.htm 
(last vi sited May 1 4, 2006). The significance is that BIS does n ot att ribute these outreach programs 
a s  being de signed to  prevent businesse s  from getting caught-which would be  the goal if the export 
enforcement mechanism were n ot self-g overn ing-but a s  designed to prevent damage to national 
secu rity through preventing ex ports. This is a tac it recognition of the fact that BIS cann ot enforce 
the regulation s  reactively and that the onu s fall s  to indu stry to prevent most . v iolati ons. 
32. BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., ANN. REP. F ISCAL YEAR 2003, at 2 1 -25 (2004) [hereinafter 
FY2003], available at http://www.bis.d oc.g ov/news/2004i03AnnualRept/index.htm. 
33. BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., ANN. REP. F ISCAL YEAR 2004, at 2 1-25 (2005), available at 
http://www.bi s.doc.gov/news/2005/04Annua1Re pt/Chapters I to 7 .htm#ch2. 
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year 2003 BIS recorded 12,443 license applications, a seventeen percent 
increase over 2002.34 Yet total U.S. exports in 2003 increased only five per­
cent over 2002.3 5  Unless we are to conclude that there was a remarkable 
spike in controlled exports as a proportion of total exports, the increase in 
license applications indicates that exporters were simply being more vigilant 
in applying for licenses. Similarly, BIS recently began recording statistics 
on preventive enforcement activities. In fiscal year 2003, the bureau com­
pleted thirty-four administrative enforcement settlements for export control 
violations,yet through aggressive preventative measures, the bureau 
thwarted an additional 136 potential violations before they could occur.36 
This is a noteworthy success for the bureau, but it also underscores the sus­
picion that self-regulation is necessary: postviolation enforcement is 
catching only a fraction of the potential violations. 
In summary, the nature of the regulations and the evidence from BIS en­
forcement efforts lead to the conclusion that export controls rely largely, in 
fact almost entirely, on self-regulatory behavior by exporters. Most exports 
are unlicensed, and even the licensed exports would overburden the en­
forcement teams if every export had to be individually precleared. Thus the 
burden is on the exporter to learn the regulations, to ensure compliance, and 
to report appropriately. The burden therefore falls to the exporters to develop 
a corporate compliance program. Part II considers the relationship between 
corporate compliance and culpability. 
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES 
FOR EXPORT CONTROL VIOLATIONS 
Corporate punishment could potentially serve a number of objectives, 
including deterring violations, condemning, imposing retribution for moral 
blameworthiness, reforming the offending firm, or incapacitating the 
wrongdoer from causing further harm.37 In this Part, these competing justifi­
cations for penalties are considered in light of the unusual nature of 
exporting firms, first by considering the stated goals of BIS enforcement 
efforts, then by considering in turn the nature of deterrence, rehabilitation, 
incapacitation, and retribution as they apply specifically to export controls. 
This Part argues that deterrence and rehabilitation, the stated goals of BIS, 
are well suited to the nature of export control violations, but that incapacita­
tion and retribution should not be entirely dismissed as motives for tailoring 
enforcement actions to the compliance culture of the firm. 
34. FY2003, supra note 32, ch. 2. 
35. U.S. INT'L. TRADE ADMIN. FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS (2004), available at 
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/aggregate/H03T06.html. 
36. FY2003, supra note 32. 
37. In fact, the list of reasons to punish a c orporation can include any of the foll owing: fault 
rationales, c oercive rati onales, ec onomic rationales, signaling rationales, retributive rationales, re­
formative rationales, and c ompensatory rationales. See generally RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE 
CRIME AND SENTENCING§§ 2.3 . 1-2.3.7 ( 1 994). 
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A. On the Record: Stated Goals of BIS 
Before considering the possible theoretical justifications for imposing 
penalties on offending firms, it is probably best to first consider the stated 
objectives of the BIS enforcement division. The published goals of the De­
partment of Commerce indicate that prevention and education of potential 
violators are their objectives. In enforcing export control violations, "[t]he 
primary roles of BIS's Export Enforcement program are to prevent the ille­
gal export of dual-use items before they occur; investigate and assist in the 
prosecution of violators of the [EAR] . . .  and inform and educate exporters, 
freight forwarders, and manufacturers of their enforcement responsibilities 
under the EAR . . . ."3 8 Leaving aside the second objective, which as a ge­
neric commitment to prosecuting violations could be viewed as a 
commitment to any of the justifications for punishment, the other two stated 
objectives of BIS are to prevent and to educate, with prevention noticeably 
listed first.It is noteworthy that BIS does not make a distinction between 
prevention by means of deterrence, by means of rehabilitation, or by means 
of incapacitation.39 It is also reasonable to infer from the commitment to 
education and information that BIS seeks to rehabilitate offending, or poten­
tially offending, firms. These goals, along with other possible goals of 
administrative penalties, will be considered in the sections that follow. 
B. The Goal and Challenge of Deterrence 
One likely justification for imposing administrative penalties on errant 
organizations is to deter.4 0  The term deterrence as applied to a business en­
tity is, to some extent, a paradox, since it implies a potential that cannot be 
ascribed to a "fictional legal entity . . . [that] cannot itself be 'deterred.' ,,4i 
At the very most, assigning culpability to an organization can deter those 
individuals who comprise the organization or who act as its agents.4 2  In fact, 
the existence of corporate liability can be supported in some cases on the 
grounds that only by punishing the corporate actor can the true social costs 
of transgression be internalized.43 Individual actors within the business en­
tity are often "judgment-proof' in that they are unable to absorb the large 
penalties that must be levied in order to make the deterrence effectively 
more painful than the gain that would otherwise be realized by the organiza-
38. BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC. , EXPORT ENFORCEMENT, http://www.bis.doc.g ov/ 
c omplianceandenforcement/index.htm (last visited M ar. 26, 2006). 
39. For clarity, in this N ote the term deterrence will apply to intents to prevent behavi or 
through a fear of penalties, the term rehabilitation will refer t o  reforming offenders s o  that there is 
n o  future desire to misbehave, and incapacitati on will refer to efforts to make future offenses impos­
sible. See WAYNER. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW§ 1.5 (2003). 
40. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1493-96 (1996). 
41. Id. at 1494. 
42. Id. at 1494--95. 
43. Id. 
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tion.44 For example, the fines involved in administrative sanctions can range 
up to hundreds of thousands of dollars, perhaps even millions if multiple 
national security violations are committed.4 5  Most individuals are unable to 
absorb the costs of such sanctions, so marginally increasing the sanction in 
order to adjust deterrence has little effect, if any, on that actor. A simple ex­
ample suffices: if the fine imposed for speeding were one million dollars, 
the marginal deterrent effect on an individual of raising the fine to two mil­
lion dollars would be minimal at best. The individual is said to be judgment­
proof since either fine, one million or two million, is equally destructive; the 
individual cannot internalize the cost of either fine. But the same marginal 
increase in costs to a corporate entity that can internalize the cost makes a 
difference to the entity in making compliance decisions.46 
Yet there is an alternative hypothesis. If we abandon the vision of the 
corporation as a rational actor and replace it with a vision of the corporation 
as a conglomeration of individual actors, then mathematical calculations 
about corporate deterrence start to lose their appeal.4 7Regardless of how well 
the deterrent sanction is tailored to internalize the total social costs, the de­
cisions that lead to violations still reside in managers and other agents who 
might bring their own external costs and benefits to the decision-making 
process.48 Executives do not always confine their decisions to the costs and 
benefits that will accrue to the corporation's shareholders or other stake­
holders.49 
Given that deterrence is a stated goal of administrative sanctions, there is 
a dilemma in applying those sanctions-at least to the extent of finding the 
appropriate target of deterrence. If deterrence is aimed at the individual de­
cisionmaker, the risk is that there is no way to set the sanction high enough 
to offset the total social cost and still be appropriate to individuals without 
making them judgment-proof. If deterrence is aimed at the corporation as a 
whole, the alternative risk is that the individual decisionmaker brings exter­
nal costs and benefits to the decision that are not accounted for in setting 
sanctions in relation to benefits, social costs, and expected probability of 
punishment. Part V will return to this apparent tension between deterrence 
of corporations and individuals and will argue that by focusing deterrent 
efforts on particular key leadership positions, the tension can be resolved. 
44. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards: When Should Corporations Be Held Crimi­
nally Liable?, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1243-44 (2000). 
45. See supra note 12. 
46. Khanna, supra note 44, at 1244; see also J ohn C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No 
Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 19 MICH. L. 
REV. 386, 389-90 (1981). 
47. Compare Coffee, supra n ote 46, at 393-94 (describing this behavi oral perspective) with 
Khanna, supra note 44, at 1244 (discussing deterrence in mathemati cal terms). 
48. See Coffee, supra note 46, at 393-405. 
49. See generally Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious 
Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 13 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173 
(1997). For a discussion of the distinction between shareh olders and stakeholders in the export 
c ontext, see infra notes 105-117 and acc ompanying text. 
1794 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:1 785 
C. Goals in Conflict: Rehabilitation and Incapacitation 
There is an inherent conflict in the tasks assigned to the Department of 
Commerce that highlights the value of rehabilitation as a goal of corporate 
punishment, as well as the danger of incapacitation. The Department of 
Commerce wants exporters to thrive and grow, but only to the extent that 
they are complying with controls on which technologies go to which desti­
nation countries. In other contexts, punishment can be justified as a means 
of incapacitating, or preventing the offender from committing further 
harm.5 °  For example, an incarcerated individual is no longer able to continue 
committing crimes even if the individual is not reformed and not deterred by 
the threat of future penalties. At least in theory, a company that has demon­
strated a failure to adequately guard against the export of controlled 
dangerous technology could be prevented from exporting. For example, the 
firm could be denied any license to export controlled items for a period of 
years.5 1  In a more extreme example, an administrative penalty that drives the 
firm to insolvency would effectively amount to capital punishment of the 
corporate actor, preventing future violations.52 
There are two basic problems with carrying this rationale too far. First, 
as discussed in Part I, the government's ability to actually prevent most vio­
lations of export controls is questionable.53 The volume of exports and the 
relative scarcity of enforcement agents prevent the government from being 
certain that every item leaving the United States is properly licensed. We 
could certainly imagine a firm that, once denied export licenses, simply con­
tinued to export in the shadow of an over-tasked enforcement regime. A 
persistent and determined exporter--or even a merely inattentive one­
could circumvent such a system since the system relies so heavily on pre­
ventive actions of the exporter. This situation is significantly distinct from 
the case of criminal incapacitation by imprisoning a dangerous felon. In the 
case of an individual, the problem is reduced to separating one offender 
from the remainder of society-a task that the modem penal system seems 
capable of performing. Even assuming a regime that could effectively inca­
pacitate the corporate actor, individuals live on even after the firm dies. 
When XYZ, Inc. becomes insolvent, the chief executive and the export 
manager are likely to find their way into PDQ, Inc., and the problem has 
shifted, not disappeared. 
The second problem with relying too heavily on an incapacitation ra­
tionale for export controls is that the underlying behavior in question is 
often something that we want to encourage. The export of U.S. goods and 
technology is generally considered good for U.S. industry and the U.S. 
50. LAFAVE, supra note 39, § 1 .5 .  
5 1 .  1 5  C.F.R. § §  7 64.3(a)(2), 7 66.25 (2005 ). 
52. See, e.g., David Morris, Capital Punishment for Corporations?, S T. PAUL PIONEER 
PRESS, Sept. 22, 1998, at 9A. 
53. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
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economy.54 The Department of Commerce is in a conflicted pos1t1on, 
charged with both generally encouraging exports and yet specifically pre­
venting unlicensed exports.5 5  This leaves the incapacitation argument with 
limited appeal. 
In some cases a denial of export privileges could serve the interests of 
preventing harm without significant costs to the economy, and it is easy to 
understand the inclusion of denial orders as one tool of administrative sanc­
tions in such cases.5 6  But widespread use of incapacitation as a justification 
for punishment could eventually cause results that conflict with other goals 
of the Department of Commerce, and of the United States as a whole. 5 7  
These other goals place the Department of Commerce in the role of encour­
aging and facilitating exports generally, making a case for corporate 
rehabilitation as an objective of any punishment regime. Leaving aside so­
cial science arguments that accompany such a discussion in the case of 
individuals, 58 it is at least possible that offending companies can be rehabili­
tated. 
Rehabilitation appears to have worked in the case of Hughes Electron­
ics. After an alleged near miss on sharing satellite technology with the 
People's Republic of China, 59 H ughes took the initiative to empanel a com­
mission to survey industry best practices in the creation of adequate internal 
compliance programs, and then implemented the commission's results for 
its future export operations. 60 Its conclusions, the Nunn-Wolfowitz Task 
Force Report on Industry Best Practices, have proven to be a watershed 
development in integrating corporate culture and export control 
54. RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., EcONOMICS 53 1-33, 7 72 -80 (HarperCollins College Pu b­
lishers, 10th ed. 1993). Assuming that exports do not replace domestic consumption, exports can be 
expected to increase production, GDP, and employment. See generally Valentino Piana, Exports, 
Economics Web Institute (2001 ), http://www.economicswebinstitute.org/glossary/exports.htm. 
55. The Department of Commerce recogni zes this in its strategic objective 1 .2: "Advance 
responsi ble economic growth and trade while protecting American security." DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FY 2004-FY 2009, at 3 (n.d. ). 
5 6. See, e.g., In re Ronald 0. Brown , No. 99-BXA-03 (Mar. 2, 2000). Mr. Brown was fined 
$1 8,000 and denied export privileges for a period of three years after settling charges that he had 
exported shotguns to R ussia in 1994. Although the export denial was suspended, the aggregate im­
pact on the United States economy of suspending Mr. Brown's budding entrepreneurship would 
have been minor. 
5 7. Compare id. with In re Federal Express Corp., Case No. E92 I (Oct. 4, 2005), available 
at http://efoia.bis.doc.gov/ExportContro1Violations/E921 .pdf, where FedEx settled an enforcement 
action for accepting for international shipment a "package of used clothes" being exported by a 
company that had been denied export privileges. The potential impact to the U.S. economy by shut ­
ting down FedEx can only be speculated. Lest we ass ume that another shipper would step into 
FedEx's place, OHL settled the following day for exporting items on behalf of the same banned 
party. In re DHL Holdings (USA) Inc. (Oct. 5, 2005 ), available at http://efoia. bis.doc.gov/ 
ExportControlViolations/E922.pdf. 
58. LAFAVE, supra note 39, § l .5(b). 
59. The rest of the soap opera plays out in Howard Diamond, House Seeks to Limit Space 
Cooperation with China, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May 1998, available at http://www. 
armscontrol.org/act/l 998_05/hd4my98.asp. 
60. NUNN-WOLFOWITZ TASK FORCE REPORT: INDUSTRY "BEST PRACTICES" REGARDING 
EXPORT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 1 ,  (July 25 ,  2000) [hereinafter NUNN-WOLFOWITZ]. 
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compliance.6 1  Reforming inadequate controls is a rational and informed re­
sponse to a noted failure to comply. Combined with penalties whose 
magnitudes make individuals judgment-proof, the ability of an organization 
to respond effectively to such failures and to seek out solutions provides at 
least one argument in favor of punishing the corporation (rather than the 
individual agent) in the first place.6 2  
D. The Odd Case for Retribution 
There is even a potential value in adjusting punishment in order to im­
pose retribution on the offending firm or to express condemnation. Granted, 
punishing business entities for purposes of retribution faces some significant 
criticism. 63 The argument goes that the corporation--despite our desires to 
vilify the institution-is a mindless entity composed of no more than the 
sum of the actions of its components and agents. To punish such an entity, in 
the sense of attaching moral blameworthiness to it, is to misunderstand its 
nature. To ascribe moral deficiency to the corporation is not only to engage 
in anthropomorphism but to ignore that the processes inherent in the corpo­
ration stem from human decisions.64 In one eloquent description of this 
dilemma, the problem is that business entities have "no soul to be damned, 
and no body to be kicked[.]"6 5  
But we like to kick the corpses and damn the souls of firms that appear 
to us to be particularly morally blameworthy. Contrast, for example, the 
news coverage of the failure of Enron with the bankruptcy of Delphi. De­
spite the fact that both represent corporate failures on a similar scope, one 
was vilified and the other has so far been treated as any other (albeit disas­
trously large) bankruptcy.66 After all, there are elements of similarity 
between decision-making processes in humans and internal corporate deci­
sionmaking that make the desire to express outrage or condemn particularly 
bad behavior understandable. Although there is certainly a retributive argu­
ment for singling out particular acts of individual agents of the corporation 
61 . See infra Part V. 
62. See Khanna, supra note 44, at 1245. 
63. See Khanna, supra n ote 40, at 1 494 nn.91-93 (descri bing academic support for deter­
rence and rehabilitati on rationales for corp orate criminal liability, but leaving open the possi bility of 
n on-deterrent justificati ons for civil liabi lity). 
64. See Coffee, supra n ote 4 6, at 386 n.2 ("Long before Baron Thurl ow's time, ecclesiastical 
c ourts had resp onded to corporate misbehavior by imposing the decree of excommunicati on. This 
probably represents the first occasi on on which the anthropomorphic fallacy that the c orporati on 
was but an individual misled courts."). 
65. Id. at 386  (qu oting Edward, First Baron Thurl ow). 
66. See, e.g., Press Release, Internati onal Uni on, UAW Statement on Delphi filing for bank­
ruptcy (Oct. 8, 2005), available at http://www.uaw. org/news/newsarticle.cfm ?Artld=34 6 (n oting 
that "[t]he UAW is deeply disappointed" but reserving the UAW's criticism for recently reneg otiated 
executive severance packages). But see Jill Stewart, Enron 's a Sideshow, SAN DIEGO CITYBEAT, 
http://www.sdcitybeat.c om/article.php?id =2 1 8 6  ("Let's stipulate that Enron is evil . . . . ") (last vis­
ited Mar. 2 6, 200 6). 
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for their wrongdoing, it is questionable how effective it might be to extend 
that outrage to the corporate body itself.67 
Nevertheless, attaching a label of moral blameworthiness to an offend­
ing exporter can serve the purpose of triggering reputational sanctions not 
only against the company, but also against the individuals affiliated with it. 
In this sense, attaching a label of moral significance to a blameworthy firm 
allows sorting behavior in the market: other market actors can avoid interac­
tion with particularly offensive players or a firm can be punished for the 
company it keeps.68 For example, the harm to Arthur Andersen's reputation 
from its role in the Enron failure led to a hemorrhage of clients and its even­
tual dernise.69 Although there is a risk that such retributivist labeling might 
be used irrationally, there is at least the possibility that ascribing moral 
blameworthiness to an amoral entity provides valuable information to other 
actors. 
III. C OMPLIANCE CULTURE AS A FACTOR I N  PRIMARY LIABILITY 
This Part begins with a deceptively simple question: how do you deter­
mine the culpability of an organization? While the concept of organizational 
culpability or liability is by no means novel, there has been a flourishing 
interest in the topic in the wake of a number of highly publicized corporate 
failures in the last several years. 70 The first barrier to finding a simple defini­
tion of corporate culpability lies in the layers of meaning that adhere to the 
term "culpability" itself.71 This Part argues that considering internal compli­
ance regimes cannot be relegated to a mere aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance, but actually is a necessary component of considering the ma­
jor factor of "degree of willfulness." 
The penalty guidance that has now been added to the EAR includes as a 
primary determining factor "the degree of willfulness" of the offense. 72 The 
penalty guidance indicates that for cases where export violations occur due 
to simple negligence or carelessness, a civil penalty or letter of warning will 
67. See Al bert W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment of Corporations: Of Frank­
pledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REv. 307, 3 1 1 - 1 3  (1 99 1 ); Khanna, supra note 40, at 1 494 n.9 1 
("[T ]he n otion that s ocie ty has a retributive need so great that it must punish n onhuman entit ies and 
label them criminal, h owever, requ ires empirical support and seems implausible."). 
68. I am indebted to Doug Chartier for rais ing th is interest ing aspect of retributive sanctions 
in the context of c orporate c ompliance. 
69. See Fl oyd Norris, loss of Leadership, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1 1 , 2002, at A l 8. 
70. For treatment of the historical devel opment of corporate l iability, see Harvey L. Pitt & 
Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second look at 
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1 559, 1 5 66-67 (1990); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, 
Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its 
Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 605 (1995); Coffee, supra n ote 4 6. 
71 . See generally Khanna, supra n ote 44. 
72. Exp ort Admin istration Regulations: Penalty Guidance in the Settlement of Administra­
t ive Enforcement Cases, 69 Fed. Reg. 78 67 (Fe b. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 15 C. F.R. pts. 764 and 
766). 
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be sufficient in many cases.73 In cases of gross negligence, willful blindness 
to the EAR, or knowing or willful violations of the regulations, the penalties 
might be more severe, including denial of export privileges.7 4  
The difficulty with this approach i s  in determining a degree o f  willful­
ness without considering the culture of compliance within the exporter 
company. Assuming a case where there is no clear evidence of intent-for 
example no mission statement that discusses how best to violate export laws 
or a "smoking memo" that shows a knowing violation-one way to make 
those fine distinctions between simple negligence and gross negligence is to 
examine the internal procedures, or lack thereof, that led to the inadvertent 
violation. It is logically incoherent to try to consider the willfulness of such 
an act without considering the policies, procedures, and leadership failures 
that made the violation possible. 
An exporter might hope for guidance from BIS on how culpability will 
be determined, but the penalty guidance itself acknowledges the difficulty of 
defining the corporate state of mind. The best that a confused exporter can 
get from the penalty guidance is the conclusory and circular logic that "BIS 
may regard a violation of any provision of the EAR as knowing or willful if 
the facts and circumstances of the case support that conclusion."7 5  BIS says 
that ignoring the so-called "red flags"76 or "the nature and result of any in­
quiry made by the party"77 indicate willful or knowing behavior. But these 
may be isolated cases and provide little guidance to the exporter or the 
judge. 
These two positions are in some tension. On the one hand, lack of a req­
uisite mental state does not preclude liability for the underlying strict 
liability violation. But the penalty guidance, assuming a violation has oc­
curred, places culpability at the forefront of the considerations for sanctions. 
This administrative regime contrasts with criminal prosecution for such vio­
lations, where there must be some intent. For example, the EAR specifically 
limit criminal enforcement to cases of knowing or willful violation.78 Pun­
ishment by administrative proceeding does not, on the surface, require such 
culpability. For example, administrative enforcement proceedings are begun 
with a formal charging letter that must, among other things, state that there 
is reason to believe that a violation of the EAR has occurred, set out the es­
sential facts of the alleged violation, give notice of sanctions available, and 
explain the remedies available to the party charged with a violation. 79 After 
73. Id. at 7867-7 1 .  
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 787 1 .  
76. Behavior by the foreign buyer that should raise s uspicions-for example, a long-time 
client, a small b akery that imports flour, tries to buy sophisti cated lasers. 
77. Export Administration Regulations: Penalty G uidance in the Settlement of Administra­
tive Enforcement Cases, 69 Fed. Reg. 7867 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 1 5  C.F.R. pts. 764 and 
766). 
78. 1 5  C. F.R. § 764.3 (2005). 
79. Id. § 766.3. 
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discovery and hearings, the role of the administrative law judge is to deter­
mine "whether there has been a violation."80 At no point in the process does 
the regulation raise the possibility that exporters can raise a defense based 
on a lack of intent.81 
In other contexts, corporate compliance programs can be viewed as a bar 
to liability. Normally the acts of an employee or other agent are attributable 
to the corporation if they are performed within the scope of employment 
even if the acts are prohibited by company policy.82 By that logic, export 
failures on the part of an employee contrary to stated company policy would 
still be attributable to the company. But this need not be the case. Consider, 
for example, employer vicarious liability for sexual harassment committed 
by its agents in the wake of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.83 While not 
reversing the long-standing rule of agency law noted above, the Court held 
out a theory of employer liability that allows a company to disavow actions 
of subordinates provided that those actions were clearly contrary to well­
stated and formulated policies: in the context of sexual harassment "a de­
fending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, 
subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence."84 That defense consists 
of showing two elements: the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent 
and correct the behavior, and the employee unreasonably failed to take pre­
ventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer. 85 
Applying the logic of Burlington v. Ellerth to export violations invites 
two significant objections. First, the Court explicitly limited the decision to 
cases where there was no tangible detriment to the plaintiff. When an agent 
takes tangible employment action, the employer cannot escape liability by 
noting a well-drafted and thorough company policy.86 Therefore the Burling­
ton logic might not perfectly stretch to include export actions that clearly are 
imputed to the company despite contrary policies. Second, Burlington's 
reach might also be limited by the Court's reliance on the fact that one in­
tended benefit of Title VII was to encourage companies to create grievance 
procedures and reporting methods.87 On the other hand, BIS has stated a 
80. ld.§ 766.17. 
8 1 .  There i s  at least some s upport fo r  a requirement of intent in the revised penalty guidance 
found at 69 Fed. Reg. 7867. The discussion of culpa bility notes the distinction between penalties for 
wil lful and intentional violations and contrasts them with negligent violations. Id. at 7871. The 
absence of discussion of appropriate sanctions for violations that do not even rise to the level of 
negligence might be interpreted to mean that such violations are not punishable. In light of the re­
mainder of 1 5  C. F.R. § 766 (2005), such a conclusion is probably not warranted. 
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 230 ( 1 958). For a discussion of the value of con-
sidering corporate compliance programs as a bar to liability, see Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 70. 
83. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 ( 1 998). 
84. Id. at 765. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 762-63. 
87. Id. at 764. 
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desire to encourage the creation of similar reporting and grievance proce­
dures by exporters.ss In that sense, Burlington remains informative. 
Despite the apparent relevance of corporate compliance to liability, the 
use of company policies in this context is the exception rather than the 
rule. s9 This need not be the case. There are several reasons that allowing 
corporate compliance culture as a defense to liability would be favorable. As 
corporations are coming to be viewed more frequently as rational actors that 
respond to deterrence and other costs and benefits,9 0  use of compliance to 
disprove mens re� fits within traditional notions of criminal defense.9 1  Fur­
ther, encouraging corporate compliance programs will increase self­
regulation, encourage good corporate citizenship, and is a cost effective 
method of regulation not only for the corporation but also for enforcement 
• 92 agencies. 
Corporate compliance programs provide a particularly relevant method 
of investigating the extent to which a corporation is culpable. Although such 
a program could be viewed as an outright defense to liability, the value of 
considering the program even after a determination of liability clearly has 
merits. Even if we assume that export controls are strict liability offenses, 
the stated priority of BIS in considering the "degree of willfulness" of the 
business entity cannot be easily divorced from the requirement to consider 
the ways that the corporation has attempted to prevent such violations. 
Unless we are to assume that the penalty guidance regarding "the facts and 
circumstances of the case"93 is a purely arbitrary and standardless invitation 
to the enforcement agency, there must be some method to determine corpo­
rate willfulness. Even in that light, compliance regimes cannot be relegated 
to the role of aggravating or mitigating factors-they must inform the proc­
ess of making the primary decision on culpability. 
IV. TH E  ROLE OF CORPORATE CU LTURE IN ACHIEVING 
THE GOALS OF PUNISHMENT 
There is a second reason why compliance programs ought to be consid­
ered early in the penalty phase. The history of such programs indicates that 
they are particularly well-suited to the role of deterrence in self-regulating 
industries. While the specifics of export industries might seem unique in 
88. See, e.g., B UREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., EXPORT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, http:// 
www.bis.doc.gov/ComplianceAndEnforcement/ExportManagementSystems.htm (last visited Mar. 
24, 200 6) ("An EMS can . . .  [r]einforce senior management commitment to comply with U.S. ex­
port laws and regulations to all parts of the company . . .  [and s]erve as a vehicle to communicate 
red flag indicators that raise questions about the legitimacy of a customer or transaction."). 
89. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 70, at 662-66. 
90. See Khanna, supra note 44, at 1 243-45 ; Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 70. 
9 1 .  See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 70, a t  676-77. 
92. Id. at 678-80 (arguing that compliance programs encourage self-regulation); id. at 680-
8 1  (arguing that they encourage good corporate citizenship); id. at 68 1-84 (arguing that compliance 
programs are cost effective for the regulators and the regulated). 
93. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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many ways, there are significant ways in which the problems faced b y  com­
panies in these endeavors mirror the problems that other industries have 
faced. Comparing exporting with these other industries shows that the same 
concerns and requirements that led to the widespread use of corporate cul­
ture programs in those industries are persuasive for exporters. 
Current reliance on corporate compliance· programs can be traced to a 
series of corporate governance failures during the second half of the twenti­
eth century.94 Some of the earliest, and still most widespread, uses of 
corporate compliance codes have been in the field of antitrust,95 but subse­
quent scandals have led companies to expand these codes of conduct to 
include foreign corrupt practices, insider trading, racketeering, defense con­
tracting, and even participation in clinical medical trials.9 6  
The trend did not end at the conclusion of the twentieth century. In the 
wake of several corporate financial scandals, corporate governance attention 
has been refocused on financial improprieties.97 The problem, of course, is 
not new. In their preface to the best practices report for Hughes Electron­
ics,9 8  Senator Nunn and Ambassador Wolfowitz noted the influence of such 
ideas in the mid- 1 990s as reflected in In re Caremark International Inc. De­
rivative Litigation.99 In the wake of Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing, 
corporate practices in financial statements have simply received new scru­
tiny. The provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act suggest that this will not be a 
passing trend.100 Although the scope of this Note is limited to administrative 
enforcement actions, it is also noteworthy that the United States Sentencing 
Commission has made effective compliance programs a relevant factor for 
criminal sentencing of organizations as well. to' 
The common element in these scandals and the reactions to them has 
been the recurrent return to corporate compliance methods in order to fix the 
94. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 70, at 1 575-78. 
95. Id. at 158 1 -82. 
96. Id. at 1574-1 600. 
97. See generally TIMOTHY L. FORT, ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE: BUSINESS AS MEDIATING 
INSTITUTION (2001) .  
98. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
99. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1 996). In Caremark, a derivative lawsuit was brought based on 
the board's failure to discover that employees were breaking the law. The court held that "without 
assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist . . .  that are reasonably designed to 
provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information . . .  to reach in­
formed judgments concerning both the corporation's compliance with law and its business 
performance[,]" the directors failed in their obligation to the shareholders. Id. at 970. But the direc­
tors may escape liability if there is a reporting system that "is in concept and design adequate to 
assure the board that appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a 
matter of ordinary operations, so that it may satisfy its responsibility." Id. 
1 00. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
204, 1 16 Stat. 745. 
1 0 1 .  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 8B2 . l  (2005). 
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damage that had been done and, significantly, to deter future failures. 102 
Consider, for example, General Electric's ("GE") defense of price fixing 
charges in the 1 950s. In the face of evidence of widespread willful antitrust 
behavior, GE considered relying on its antitrust corporate compliance pro­
gram as a defense. Although GE ultimately chose not to raise that defense 
and paid significant fines, the industry scrambled to implement similar pro­
grams.103 Significantly, empirical evidence suggests but does not prove that 
these programs are effective at preventing antitrust violations. Just as sexual 
harassment compliance programs are now recognized as having a deterrent 
effect in that field, 104 antitrust compliance has been increased through corpo­
rate governance programs that reward competitive behavior and establish 
internal and external reporting procedures. 105 
Corporate compliance is used to deter violations across a disparate array 
of regulations from sexual harassment to antitrust and corporate financial 
impropriety. Far more significant than the differences are the similarities 
among these areas of corporate behavior.106 For example, as with sexual har­
assment and honesty in accounting, we want companies to be largely self­
regulating. The burden falls to the company, whether it is trying to prevent 
agents from committing harassment or from falsifying financial records. As 
with sexual harassment and price fixing, the activities involved are not eas­
ily exposed without positive steps from either the corporation itself or from 
an individual empowered to bring impropriety to light. Many of the activi­
ties present a company with competing interests that tug at compliance from 
several directions. In some cases a failure to comply opens up potential 
profit for the company; in others failure to comply will have an effect on the 
security or reputation of the United States; and in some cases failure to 
comply will result in harm to third party interests. In these respects, all of 
these areas of the law share at least some characteristics with export control 
compliance. 
V. TH E  EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY BRIDGE 
Even considering that export controls are self-regulatory, that the types 
of behavior that we seek to encourage from exporters are well-suited to de-
1 02. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 70, at 1 574 ("A short summary of each scandal reveals 
that codes of conduct consistently have been touted by corporations and their adversaries as a means 
to avoid further misconduct."). 
1 03 .  Id. at 1 578-8 1 .  
1 04. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
1 05 .  Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 70, a t  1581-82. However, i t  should be noted that the 
decline in antitrust violations might be limited only to "irrational" antitrust violations, those viola­
tions that were made out of ignorance instead of a rational cost-benefit analysis of compliance or 
violation. Id. 
1 06. Significantly, there are fewer tools available to enforce export controls compared to other 
areas of regulation: competitors are unlikely to have a civil cause of action, there are no legislative 
incentives giving third parties standing to enforce, and there are no treble damages provisions. 
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terrence and rehabilitation, 107 and that a heavy emphasis on corporate com­
pliance has found support in many other areas of corporate governance with 
positive results, 108 it is not compelling simply to advocate a quick look at 
corporate policy to determine liability or penalties. There are several areas 
of tension in the foregoing observations, and it is these areas of tension that 
this Part will address. Specifically, the role of senior leadership-managers 
and boards of directors-in creating a culture of compliance provides a fo­
cal point for matching the goals of the administrative penalty and the nature 
of export control failures. This Part argues that the role of senior leadership 
bridges the gap between the judgment-proof individual and the corporate 
actor and merits the closest scrutiny in considering whether compliance is 
adequate. 
Simply advocating a strong reliance on corporate compliance runs into 
several areas where there are tensions between theoretical considerations 
and how we might expect industry to behave. The first such tension was 
touched upon, briefly, in Part IL There is an unresolved question of whether 
the corporation is best viewed as a rational actor or as a collection of human 
actors who act sometimes rationally and sometimes irrationally.1()<) A deter­
rence theory that considers one and not the other will at best be only 
partially effective. A second tension comes out of the distinction, found in 
Burlington, among other sources, between the view of the company as a 
principal, accountable for the conduct of its employee-agents, and the view 
of the company as standing (at least in some cases) above the employees 
and able to divest itself of responsibility for their actions.1 w Another tension, 
related to the first two, arises from strict liability violations where some 
level of culpability is considered in determining a penalty. 
If export control regulations require a significant measure of self­
regulating behavior, and if the goals of enforcement activities must include 
deterrence among the justifications, if not as the primary justification, then 
how do we structure the penalty? It is one thing to say, as in Part III, that we 
should make the corporate compliance culture the starting point for looking 
at culpability. It is another to say how that translates into applying the law to 
a hypothetical violator. It is the senior executives and the board of directors, 
from whom corporate compliance stems and to whom accountability is as­
signed, who can best help resolve some of the tensions identified above. 
The role of the leadership, as a component of a failure to comply with 
regulations, is twofold: first, the executive is accountable for maximizing 
corporate performance; second, the executive is responsible for balancing 
the needs of competing stakeholders in the company.1 1 1 Under one view of 
export control failures, we could view the executive as the manager who 
107. Supra Part II. 
108. Supra Part IV. 
109. See, e.g., Richard S. Gruner, Risk and Response: Organizational Due Care to Prevent 
Misconduct, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 613 ,  61 6-19  (2004); Khanna, supra note 44, at 1 243-44. 
1 10. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text. 
1 1 1 . See, e.g., Fort, supra note 49; Gruner, supra note 1 09. 
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needs to fix a broken system. The focus then would be how to tailor en­
forcement so as to maximize executive involvement and accountability for 
that system. Assuming that most managers want to obey the law, 1 12 and that 
the compliance regimes discussed in Parts III and IV are in place, evaluating 
corporate noncompliance can be viewed in a way similar to many other 
management failures. 
This "defect" in performance can be traced to one or more of several po­
tential causes within the organization. Individuals within management might 
direct employees toward illegal activity, management might fail to educate 
or motivate employees about lawful conduct, management responses to vio­
lations might not correct known problems, or the violation could have been 
an unforeseen by-product of legitimate corporate behavior. 1 1 3 In all of these 
cases, the violation raises the question of what procedures were in place to 
prevent such lapses, and how diligent group leaders were in appropriately 
applying the procedures. 
The frrst of these failures represents an extreme case. Self-regulation 
breaks down in such cases, where management intentionally directs subor­
dinates to violate export controls. These cases are well-suited for criminal 
prosecution. 1 14 The other three failure modes cannot be addressed without 
directly inquiring into the role that management plays within the compliance 
structure. For example, if the failure lies in failing to motivate employees to 
obey the law, the cause and remedy cannot be judged purely on the basis of 
whether there is a stated policy of control compliance. To borrow from re­
cent financial scandals, the document shredding at Enron and Arthur 
Andersen violated written policies in both companies, yet it was encour­
aged-if not demanded-by executives.1 1 5 Likewise, if the failure of the 
company stems from a management failure to respond to a known problem, 
the existence of informal reporting procedures is not an adequate defense.1 1 6 
Such a view of export control violations as a manageable defect of an 
executive's performance can help resolve some of the tensions that exist 
1 1 2. GRUNER, supra note 37, § 1 . 10. 1 .  Admittedly, this view would not provide guidance in 
rare circumstances where a sizeable portion of the senior leadership of the business entity intention­
ally encourage, or cause, violations to occur. In such cases, the value of considering the deterrence 
effect of administrative sanctions under the EAR becomes less significant, and the facts would more 
likely indicate criminal prosecution. 
1 1 3. Id. § I . I  0.2. 
1 14. In fact, BIS specifically notes such cases as being excellent candidates for concurrent 
administrative cases and criminal prosecution. Export Administration Regulations: Penalty Guid­
ance in the Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases, 69 Fed. Reg. 7867 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to 
be codified at 1 5  C.F.R. pts. 764 and 766). 
1 15 .  I assume here for the purpose of argument that the facts alleged at trial in United States v. 
Arthur Andersen LLP, No. H-02- 1 2 1 ,  2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26870 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 2002), are 
true despite the Supreme Court's reversal for faulty jury instructions. Arthur Andersen LLP v. 
United States, 54 1 U.S. 696 (2005). 
1 1 6. Compare such a case with the logic of Burlington Industries Inc. v. El/erth: the two­
prong test for a company to escape liability requires that the company has reporting procedures in 
place and that the plaintiff exhausted those procedures. The parallels to export controls are clear: use 
of compliance procedures has to be tempered by the extent to which failures within the organization 
are acted upon. 524 U.S. 742 ( 1998). 
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between corporate deterrence and individual action. But it does not account 
for the fact that the business can be making a rational export decision that 
simply fails to comply. A second view of corporate ethics failures can re­
solve some of the other tensions. An export offense might appear to be a 
purely rational decision. After all, the benefits of compliance with export 
controls accrue to society as a whole, while the costs of noncompliance are 
not fully internalized to the firm.1 11 Here the failure to comply can be seen as 
a failure to account for stakeholders whose daily influence is not felt in the 
• 1 18 corporation. 
In some ways, the export controls in the EAR are a way of internalizing 
the needs of particular discrete non-shareholder stakeholders-the United 
States government and society at large-into the decision-making process. 
Indeed, the influence and values of external stakeholders-those who have a 
vested interest in the activities of the corporation that transcends revenue, 
balance sheets, and profit-are a valid constraint on the performance of the 
company. The view of corporate violation as a failure to internalize the ex­
ternal stakeholders provides a counterpoint to the view of the offense as a 
failure to maximize performance. The common aspect of both, however, is 
the key role that the senior leadership plays in assembling the competing 
goals, creating the process that will tum goals into accomplishments, creat­
ing the institutional channels for feedback, and monitoring the system. 
Compare, for example, the role that non-shareholder stakeholders play 
in Shlensky v. Wrigley. 1 19 The plaintiff, a stockholder in the defendant base­
ball club, made a series of allegations in a shareholder derivative suit. Mr. 
Wrigley, despite shocking financial losses that were unrivalled in all of Ma­
jor League Baseball, believed that "baseball is a 'daytime sport' and that the 
installation of lights and night baseball games [would] have a deteriorating 
effect upon the surrounding neighborhood."12 0 The complaint alleged that the 
failure to install lights in Wrigley Field was causing financial ruin. The evi­
dence, as pleaded by the plaintiff, painted a bleak picture indeed for the 
Cubbies. Although White Sox attendance was the same for games during the 
weekend, White Sox attendance far exceeded Cubs attendance during the 
week, when the Cubs played during the day and the Sox played at night. 121 
The beleaguered Cubs even had to endure the fact that attendance at Cubs 
games on the road outpaced attendance at home. 122 The solution, from a 
1 1 7 .  Compare Khanna, supra note 44, with Gruner, supra note 109. 
1 1 8. To clarify the distinction: a shareholder is a legal person who owns some fraction of the 
firm in question. By contrast, a stakeholder is any entity that has a significant interest in the actions 
of the firm. So although all shareholders can be presumed to be stakeholders, the latter category is 
significantly more expansive. Among the latter would be the government, the neighbors of the firm 
in question, customers, vendors, employees, alliances, and perhaps even competitor firms. See Fort, 
supra note 49. 
1 19. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
120. Id. at 778. 
1 2 1 .  Id. 
1 22. Id. 
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financial perspective, was clear: lights and night games were the way of the 
future. 123 Mr. Wrigley, of course, would have none of it. And the court, in 
finding for the defendant, held that the obligation of the director to ensure 
financial returns for the shareholders was only one of many obligations: the 
obligation to the surrounding neighborhood might equally be in the interests 
of the corporation. 124 
To reconcile the views of corporate culture, as expressed by BIS in its 
model Export Management System (EMS), with the views of corporate cul­
ture as a viable evaluation of culpability for the purposes of deterring export 
violations would require a renewed emphasis on leadership accountability. 
As noted above, the apparent tension between the corporation as rational 
actor and the corporation as a collection of potentially irrational individuals 
center around the leadership and accountability of executives. It is only 
through active involvement of senior leaders in preventing violations that a 
system of compliance as a defense to liability makes sense. 12 5  
The distinction between a compliance program and a compliance culture 
resurfaces time and again, from Burlington to Caremark and at points in 
between. These distinctions are made clear in contrasting the view of execu­
tive leadership found in the EMS guidelines that BIS has published and the 
view of executive leadership found in the Nunn-Wolfowitz report. While 
both sources speak to the value, in fact the necessity, of leadership account­
ability, it is Nunn- Wolfowitz that suggests that the compliance committee 
report directly to the board of directors. 126 Not only does this approach speak 
to the concerns found in Caremark, but it also helps to bring into focus the 
obligations to stakeholders outside of the company. 121 
Other distinctions between Nunn-Wolfowitz and EMS are subtle, but 
present. EMS stresses that managers should make a policy statement, pref­
erably in writing. 12 8 The management should reiterate to employees, at least 
on an annual basis, that they are committed to export control compliance. 129 
Contrast this with the language from Nunn- Wolfowitz: "[s]enior manage­
ment must . . .  place constant emphasis on . . .  compliance and take every 
reasonably available opportunity to reiterate" this commitment. 130 
123. Id. 
1 24. Id. at 780-8 1 .  
1 25. By analogy: Burlington v. Ellerth does not stand for the proposition that any compliance 
system is a bar to liability, but that employers must show, as part of an affirmative defense, that they 
"exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly" the offending behavior. 524 U.S. 742, 
765 ( 1998). 
126. NUNN-WOLFOWITZ, supra note 60, at 1 1 . 
127. In re Caremark Int'! Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1 996). 
128. BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ELEMENT 1: MANAGEMENT 
COMMITMENT POLICY, http://www.bis.doc.gov/exportmanagementsystems/pdf/admin 1 .pdf. (last 
visited May 1 2, 2006.) 
129. Id. 
1 30. N UNN-WOLFOWITZ, supra note 60, at 8. 
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A further example of the divide between the compliance culture as 
viewed by the EMS and by the Nunn- Wolfowitz best practices is in training. 
EMS recommends that the firm conduct export control training for all em­
ployees who will be involved in export-related functions.1 3 1  B ut Nunn­
Wolfowitz goes further, encouraging a best practice that provides initial 
training and periodic reinforcement of the message to all employees, and 
then focuses the message on those employees involved in exporting.132 The 
best practices also go above and beyond the EMS with respect to the breadth 
and scope of desired training. Nunn- Wolfowitz makes the point of emphasiz­
ing periodic training even for the board of directors, including for a 
compliance committee thereof.133 No parallel provision appears in the 
EMS.134 
What lessons are to be drawn from this quick survey of the role of the 
executive? One would be that Hughes Electronics, and their best practices 
task force, appear to have learned the lessons that were hard-learned by the 
other industries that came before. From sexual harassment and antitrust to 
accounting improprieties and social responsibility beyond the shareholder, 
corporate performance is maximized and violations minimized not merely 
when a compliance program is created, but also when a compliance culture 
is created. The executive embodies the point where the tension between the 
corporation as a legal person and the absence of traditional mens rea is fo­
cused. Although the executive has proven to occasionally be the source of 
violations, there are equally compelling examples where the executive built 
the necessary culture that prevented inadvertent violations of standards. 
CONCLUSION 
Export controls are complex rules that span multiple government agen­
cies, have various competing objectives, and are found in numerous sources. 
Successfully navigating these regulations is made all the more difficult by 
the fact that companies are under an obligation to self-regulate. Fundamen­
tally, it is the leadership that is responsible for creating a culture of 
compliance and ensuring that violations do not occur. When violations do 
happen, BIS is faced with the need to use postviolation enforcement to try to 
deter future offenses while still encouraging legitimate exports to fuel the 
U.S. economy. 
The EAR enforcement provisions allow BIS to consider corporate com­
pliance as an aggravating or mitigating factor once culpability is 
determined. In many respects, this is backwards. Understanding the role of 
corporate compliance culture is in fact a necessary prerequisite for deter­
mining the corporate "degree of willfulness." Even if this were not so, 
1 3 1 .  BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ELEMENT 4: TRAINING (200 1 ), 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/exportmanagementsystems/pdf/admin4.pdf [hereinafter EMS ELEMENT 4]. 
1 32. NUNN-WOLFOWITZ, supra note 60, at 19-2 1 .  
1 33. Id. at 1 8. 
1 34. EMS ELEMENT 4, supra note 1 3 1 .  
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decades of experience with similar regulatory enforcement problems has 
shown repeatedly that it is the extent and effectiveness of compliance pro­
grams that bears most heavily on adequate deterrence. 
The answer cannot stop at considering the existence and effectiveness of 
compliance programs. These complex questions of how and why companies 
act as they do cannot be reduced to such a simple model. But by bringing 
the individual into the equation, in the form of executive buy-in and culpa­
bility, BIS could start to resolve these tensions. The methods are effective in 
other areas of regulatory compliance, and could be applied in export con­
trols as well. 
